

Some linguist 'makes sure' that every quantifier takes inverse scope: the semantics and scope-islandhood of complement CPs

Under predicative approaches to clausal complementation (Kratzer 2006, 2013; Moulton 2009, 2015; Moltmann 2013, 2014; Bogal-Allbritten 2016; Elliott 2020, a.o.), it has been proposed that not all CPs denote predicates of individuals with propositional content; some denote predicates of entities (minimal situations/exact verifiers/events) that do not carry propositional content (Moltmann 2021; Bondarenko 2022). In this talk, I first argue that this dichotomy in the semantics of CPs is attested in English, in particular between (i) complement CPs of canonical attitude verbs, e.g. *believe* and *claim*, and (ii) those of less reportive clause-embedding verbs, e.g. *ensure/make sure*. I then propose that the scope-islandhood of a complement CP is determined by its semantics; the aforementioned dichotomy of CPs therefore helps explain the (finite-)clause-boundedness of quantificational scope (1) (Chomsky 1975; May 1977) and its relaxation under clause-embedding verbs like *ensure/make sure* (2) (Farkas & Giannakidou 1996; Barker 2022; Hoeks et al. 2022). I will also discuss implications of the proposal on a broader range of clause-embedding verbs, including *prove* and *confirm*, whose complement CPs have been reported to also admit extra-wide inverse scope (Palucci 2024).

- (1) Some student {believed/claimed} [that every guest had a ride]. (some>every;*every>some)
- (2) Some student {ensured/made sure} [that every guest had a ride].(some>every; every>some)